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Abstract: In this essay, we explore an issue of moral uncertainty: 
what we are permitted to do when we are unsure about which moral 
principles are correct. We develop a novel approach to this issue that 
incorporates important insights from previous work on moral 
uncertainty, while avoiding some of the difficulties that beset 
existing alternative approaches. Our approach is based on evaluating 
and choosing between option sets rather than particular conduct 
options. We show how our approach is particularly well-suited to 
address this issue of moral uncertainty with respect to agents that 
have credence in moral theories that are not fully consequentialist. 
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I Introduction 
 
With respect to issues that are the subject of heated moral and political debate, 
regarding them as uncertain or even suspending belief about their moral status often 
seems to be the most sensible positions to take.
1
 However, whatever we may decide to 
believe about these issues (if we decide to believe something about them at all), we 
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 Throughout this essay we will use the term ‘uncertain’ in the colloquial sense—the condition of being 
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-2- 
will often find ourselves in situations where we must conduct ourselves in ways that 
reflect practical attitudes toward them.  
To take a commonplace example, suppose that Sue could either send her son 
to an excellent private school, or send him to an adequate state-funded school, 
enabling her to donate the money she would have spent to charities tackling global 
poverty. Let us imagine that Sue is uncertain whether it is permissible to send her son 
to the private school, given what else she could do with the money. However 
uncertain she may be about this matter, she either will or will not send her son to the 
private school. If she does send him, then she acts in a way that seems inconsistent 
with a sincere commitment to the view that it is impermissible to send him to the 
school. We then must face the issue, as Andrew Sepielli (2009) has aptly described it, 
of what to do when we don’t know what to do. Given how ubiquitous uncertainty 
about the ethical status of different choices is, it is surely a matter of major 
philosophical and practical importance how we should behave, and how we should 
decide how to behave, when we are morally uncertain. This issue has, however, only 
recently begun to receive systematic attention from moral philosophers.
2
 
In this essay we seek to advance debate on moral uncertainty by proposing a 
distinctive approach to these issues. This approach advises uncertain agents to 
consider and evaluate different option sets rather than considering each option on its 
own. So far as we know, all philosophers who have, to date, proposed solutions to the 
problem of moral uncertainty have focused on individual options. Doing so, we argue, 
fails to take into account key non-consequentialist concerns, and so will fail to address 
any form of moral uncertainty in which non-consequentialist theories play a role. In 
contrast, our approach can handle a mixture of consequentialist and non-
                                                 
2
 Some noteworthy recent contributions to this nascent literature are: Ross 2006; Moller, 2011; Jackson 
and Smith 2006; Guerrero 2007; Lockhart 2000; Sepielli 2006, 2013a, 2013b; Weatherson 2002.. For 
an overview, see Sepielli (forthcoming). 
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consequentialist theories, as well as situations where only consequentialist theories 
are in play. 
We used the term ‘approach’ rather than, say, ‘theory’ advisedly. This is 
because we do not pretend to have settled all the issues here. In particular, the 
difficulty of inter-theoretic comparisons of value, something which plagues most 
approaches to the problem of moral uncertainty, is amplified on our view (we will 
describe below how this is so). In addition, there may be several different variants of 
our approach which nevertheless agree with our fundamental contention – that option 
sets, not individual options, should be the unit of comparison. In our view, the nascent 
debate on moral uncertainty has gone in the wrong direction, and we hope to offer an 
alternative path here. We hope that in laying out that alternative path, we will inspire 
others to come with us, and help us to develop it more fully. 
 
II Preliminaries 
In terms of conduct, the general question posed by moral uncertainty is this: given 
that I am unsure about what I should do, what should I do? It might be thought that 
the answer to this question is obvious: I should do the morally right, or perhaps 
morally best, thing. This is not wrong, since of course I should, objectively speaking
3
, 
do the morally right, or perhaps morally best, thing – I ought to act in accordance with 
morality. But I need to know how I ought to act, given what is known to me at the 
time when I must decide how to act. And information about whether one or another 
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course of conduct is the morally right, or best, option is not the sort of thing that is 
known to me, since by hypothesis I am torn between rival views about what morality 
demands and/or recommends. I need guidance about what I should do, given that I am 
unsure about what morality demands and/or recommends.
4
 
 To evaluate the substantive merits of different approaches to what we ought to 
do under conditions of moral uncertainty, it is important to distinguish two 
importantly different questions that we can ask concerning what we should do in the 
face of such uncertainty. Consider the following case.  
Pregnancy 
Sue must decide whether or not to terminate her pregnancy. 
 
Sue is unsure whether or not she should terminate her pregnancy. It would be in her 
self-interest to be without the unwanted foetus, but she wants to act morally. She 
might ask two distinct moral questions: ‘given my uncertainty, what would be the 
morally best or most admirable thing for me to do?’ and ‘given my uncertainty, what 
is permissible?’ (i.e., ‘what options may I legitimately choose from?’). In this paper 
we restrict ourselves to this latter question concerning permissibility under moral 
uncertainty. 
Now, of course, many philosophers, at the first-order level, believe the 
questions of moral permissibility and moral optimality to have the same answers, 
since they believe all morally sub-optimal options to be impermissible. This does not 
mean, however, that they fail to recognise that the two questions are distinct; and so it 
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is not morally controversial, nor does it assume that the answers to the questions 
differ, to separate the questions. 
The same is true at the second-order level of moral uncertainty. In separating 
the questions of permissibility and moral optimality under conditions of moral 
uncertainty, we do not assume that the answers to these questions are different. But 
we do allow that they may be. When it comes to dealing with questions of moral 
uncertainty, it is those who fail to separate the questions of what, when uncertain, is 
morally best and morally permissible who make an unwarranted controversial 
assumption, since they cannot properly accommodate first-order theories that not only 
recognise the existence of two different questions, but acknowledge that the answers 
to them can differ. Given this, and that the difference between the questions of 
permissibility and optimality are well-recognised at the first-order level, it is perhaps 
surprising that, so far as we know, the two questions have not been fully separated in 
the nascent moral uncertainty literature to date.
5
  
Why focus on permissibility? In first-order moral assessment, we recognise a 
fundamental distinction between claims that conduct is impermissible and claims that 
conduct is morally sub-optimal. Judgements of impermissibility carry a special kind 
of moral gravity, and impermissible actions attract a special kind of moral blame. 
Therefore, it seems appropriate to treat the issue of permissibility under uncertainty as 
particularly pressing. 
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Philosophers have worried about the nature of the oughts that theories of 
moral uncertainty try to capture.
6
 It could either be a rational or a moral ought. In our 
view (which we cannot fully defend here) moral uncertainty theories deliver a (certain 
kind of) moral ought. However, it should be noted that we do not think that whether 
or not someone accepts our substantive approach to moral uncertainty will necessarily 
depend upon whether they accept our understanding of the nature of the ‘ought’. (Of 
course, if they deny that there is any sense in talking about what we ought to do, and 
what is permissible, under moral uncertainty, they will reject our specific view about 
what is permissible.) 
We think that the ought in question is a moral ought because we believe that 
those who act contrary to their moral beliefs commit a moral error. Imagine George 
and Fred both perform the same (objectively) impermissible action. George knew it to 
be impermissible, while Fred (reasonably) had no idea. Both have committed a moral 
wrong. But it seems to us that George commits an additional moral wrong to Fred – 
he does wrong, but he also does what he knows to be wrong. Now imagine George 
didn’t know the conduct was impermissible, but strongly suspected it to be so (and 
had many other options to choose from). Again, it seems that this would be a moral 
error. Given this, we are inclined to view the verdicts of moral uncertainty theories as 
moral directives.
7
 
This may seem to present us with a worry: how can morality deliver different 
verdicts - the objective verdict and the uncertainty verdict? We do not think that this 
is a major concern. As Derek Parfit (2011, 150-164) has persuasively argued, we 
should accept a plurality of senses of ‘ought’ (and cognate terms such as 
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‘permissible’). Just as we should accept ‘fact-relative’, ‘evidence-relative’, and 
‘belief-relative’ senses of ought in relation to empirical facts, evidence, and belief, so 
we should accept objective, evidence-relative, and belief-relative moral oughts in 
relation to moral facts, evidence, and belief.
8
 
In essence, then, what we are investigating here is the question of moral-
belief-relative permissibility. The idea of this kind of permissibility is that it defines 
what is permissible given our moral beliefs. Of course, our moral beliefs may be false 
(or at least some of them may be), and we may even be blameworthy for holding 
some of them. Nevertheless, given our beliefs, it seems like moral-belief-relative 
permissibility is the relevant standard for deciding which options are permissible 
under conditions of moral uncertainty. This can be contrasted with objective 
permissibility, the kind of permissibility that philosophers are usually interested in. 
In the next few sections we will present, assess and reject a variety of 
approaches to moral-belief-relative permissibility under moral uncertainty. In doing 
so, we will show how these approaches give direction to agents that, we argue, is 
implausible. Note that when we criticize approaches to decision-making under moral 
uncertainty because they allow or disallow some course of conduct, we do not mean 
that it seems implausible that a view treats some course of conduct as objectively 
morally permissible or impermissible. That type of claim is the type to be considered 
in first-order moral deliberation. In judging whether a theory of moral decision-
making under conditions of moral uncertainty is plausible, we must instead ask 
whether it is plausible that, given this agent’s beliefs, the conduct in question is moral-
belief-relative (im)permissible. 
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III The My Favourite Theory Approach 
One way to approach the issue of moral uncertainty is for the agent to weigh up the 
best arguments for different moral theories or principles, and then be guided only by 
the theory or principle she finds most plausible. This is, tacitly, how most moral 
philosophers appear to approach the problem—they offer arguments for a course (or 
courses) of conduct they deem to be permissible or best, and hope to convince others. 
Following Ted Lockhart (2000, 42-43), we will refer to this as the My Favourite 
Theory Approach to moral uncertainty. Once an agent has done her best to decide 
which conduct options are permissible or morally best, lingering doubts about 
whether or not she is really confident that these conduct options have this moral status 
are treated as irrelevant—she should act on these options as if she were not in doubt 
about their moral status.
 
 
If we are unsure about some matters of empirical fact that pertain to the 
question of how we ought to act, that should influence how we act. We don’t act as if 
something is definitely true just because we know it’s possible that it is true, or even 
likely to be true. And yet the My Favourite Theory Approach would have us ignore 
uncertainty about moral principles when it comes to acting. Consider Pregnancy.
9
 
Imagine that Sue is 51% confident that abortion is permissible, but accepts that if it is 
impermissible then it would be a serious moral wrong, akin to murder, to have an 
abortion. She is sure that carrying the foetus to term is (in her case, at least) 
permissible. The My Favourite Theory Approach would render abortion moral-belief-
relative permissible, even though she is 49% confident that it is objectively very 
seriously wrong. On this view she should view herself as moral-belief-relative 
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permitted to abort the foetus even though she believes it is nearly as likely that she 
will be committing murder as that she will be acting objectively permissibly.  
We regard the advice given by the My Favourite Theory Approach in this case 
(and others like it) to be highly implausible. In Pregnancy Sue should not (given her 
beliefs) regard herself as moral-belief-relative permitted to have an abortion, and 
consequently she ought not to have an abortion. We wouldn’t ordinarily perform 
some action that carried a 49% chance (or, for that matter, a 20% chance) of being a 
serious moral wrong akin to murder (unless moral reasons concerning the alternatives 
rendered that the best of a bad bunch of options), so why should the fact that the 
uncertainty in question is moral uncertainty change that? We think that our 
uncertainty in these cases should properly be reflected in what we are moral-belief-
relative permitted to do.  
 
IV Sophisticated Theory Selection 
It seems important that the fact that we are morally uncertain be reflected in how we 
decide to act – an agent take into account all the principles or theories in which she 
credence when deciding what to do, not just those views in which she has most 
credence. 
But how should we incorporate our uncertainty? Crucially, in tackling the 
question of moral-belief-relative permissibility under moral uncertainty, we must 
decide whether we should be seeking a moral theory to act in accordance with or a 
particular course or courses of conduct. In other words, should our theory of 
permissibility under moral uncertainty seek to directly pick out one (or more) of the 
conduct options available to us, or should it seek to pick out one of the theories we 
hold credence in for us to adopt for the purposes of action? 
-10- 
 The My Favourite Theory Approach recommends looking for a theory, and it 
has a very simple rule about how to obtain the right theory to act on —that is, we 
should employ the one we find most plausible. We might, however, seek out a more 
sophisticated way of finding a moral theory to act on. Such an approach might be 
inspired by
10
 Jacob Ross’s (2006, 743) suggestion that we should ‘accept’ (i.e., use 
for action-guidance)
11
 a theory based on the following considerations: 
in deciding what theory to accept, although we have pro tanto reason to prefer 
more probable theories to less probable ones, we also have pro tanto reason to 
prefer theories according to which the differences or dispersion among the 
values of our options is higher to theories according to which this dispersion is 
lower. We may call this the ‘dispersion principle’. (Ross 2006, 758). 
 
On Ross’s view, how much credence we place in a moral theory is an important factor 
in choosing what theory to accept; but so too is what is at stake, and there is more at 
stake in theories with higher ‘dispersion.’ Accordingly, we need to measure how 
much is at stake (Ross suggests the difference between the best option and the average 
value of the options) and multiply this by the (subjective) probability that the theory is 
true.
12
 This will give us the expected value of accepting a given theory. We might be 
tempted to apply this more sophisticated way of selecting a theory, or something like 
it, to our question concerning moral-belief-relative permissibility, and accept and act 
in accordance with the theory with the highest expected value. 
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leaves the issue of what we are to do unanswered. We are grateful to a referee for useful comments 
here. 
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However, any approach which focuses on selecting a theory to follow under 
uncertainty is vulnerable to damaging objections. However sophisticated the choice 
mechanism, in asking us to choose a theory to act on, such an approach gets things 
wrong at the first step. Consider an example, Emergency, in which Sue must decide 
what she may permissibly do when confronted with ten drowning people. She has 
three conduct options but is unsure which of two theories is correct. Imagine that the 
conduct options available to Sue are the following: 
Option A is killing one person to save ten; 
Option B is mildly harming one person to save eight; 
Option C is leaving the bystander alone and allowing the drowning people to 
die. 
 
Theory 1 is a form of consequentialism, while Theory 2 gives significant 
weight to distinctions such as doing and allowing harm, and intending and foreseeing 
harm. On Theory 1 it is seriously wrong to allow ten people to drown, and permissible 
(indeed, required) to kill an innocent bystander to save them. It is impermissible to 
harm someone to save eight, as it does not bring about the best consequences (saving 
ten), but more wrongful to do nothing. On Theory 2, it is seriously wrong to kill an 
innocent, less wrongful to harm an innocent and permissible (indeed, required) to 
leave the bystander alone. Sue assigns a ‘zero’ score to those options that are 
permitted and then a negative score to impermissible actions. The worse an 
impermissible option is, the lower the score. The payoffs associated with the conduct 
-12- 
options (according to the theories in which Sue has some credence) are represented in 
Table 1.
13
 
 
Table 1 
 Theory 1 Theory 2 
 Option A 0 -20 
 Option B -2 -2 
 Option C -20 0 
 
We suggest that, if she places roughly equal credence in both theories, Sue ought to 
regard Option B as moral-belief-relative permissible, indeed required, even though 
both theories in which she places credence would condemn Option B as objectively 
impermissible. Under any form of theory selection, however, she would be required to 
regard, as moral-belief-relative impermissible something (namely, Option B) that, 
intuitively, she should regard as what she ought to do, given her commitments. 
Let’s suppose that Sue thinks that it is slightly more likely that Theory 1 is the 
correct theory. As such, she assigns a 51% probability to Theory 1 and 49% to Theory 
2. My Favourite Theory would tell the agent to act as if Theory 1 were definitely true, 
and so perform Option A. This seems implausible, since it risks a likely serious 
wrong, when Option B—viewed as a much less serious wrong by both theories—is 
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 We assume here, for the purposes of argument, that comparisons of the wrongness of conduct are 
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point in question, as theory selection is implausible even when only ordinal rankings of options are 
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perform. The literature on moral uncertainty has begun to deal with the problem of inter-theoretic 
comparisons, but it is not a topic we take up in this paper. For interesting discussion of the problem and 
important steps towards solving it, see Ross 2006, 761–775; Sepielli 2006; 2009; 2013a. It seems 
worthwhile to us to see what kinds of principles are desirable if such comparisons are possible. This 
way, we can see which kinds of comparison it would, in fact, be useful to be able to make, and direct 
our attentions accordingly. We will return to this point in Section IX. 
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available. Sophisticated Theory Selection would also require her to adopt Option A. 
Because each of the two theories is equally ‘dispersed,’ Sue should accept, and act on, 
the theory that she views as most likely to be correct. 
If we are right that Option B is the right action to perform under moral 
uncertainty, then a seemingly paradoxical conclusion arises. For Sue, Option B is 
moral-belief-relative permissible, even though she does not believe it to be 
permissible.
14
 While this may seem paradoxical, it is not. That is because two 
different kinds of permissibility are in play. She should regard B as moral-belief-
relative permissible, and as objectively impermissible. Importantly, moral-belief-
relative permissibility does not only include those options we believe to be objectively 
permissible, and includes some that we do not. This is not as surprising as it may 
seem. After all, factual-belief-relative permissibility can include options that we know 
are fact-relative impermissible.
15
 
 
V The Hierarchical Approach 
 
Rather than any form of Theory Selection, we ought instead to develop a view which 
does not seek to provide guidance based on one particular theory or another. Instead, 
our moral-belief-relative permissible options should be constructed anew, rather than 
seeking to endorse the options provided by a particular theory. One approach of this 
type is considered by Ted Lockhart in his pioneering work Moral Uncertainty and its 
Consequences (2000). Lockhart(Lockhart 2000, 26) considers the following 
normative principle as a guide to rational (or reasonable, he uses these terms 
interchangeably) action under conditions of moral uncertainty: 
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15
 See, for example, Parfit’s (2011, 159) mineshaft case. In that case, because of uncertainty about the 
facts, we should choose to do something (allow ten to drown) that we know is fact-relative 
impermissible (since it would be avoidable if we knew all the facts).  
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PR2 
In situations of moral uncertainty, I (the decision-maker) should (rationally) 
choose some action that has the maximum probability of being morally 
[permissible].
16
 
 
That is, we ought to opt for the option that has the lowest risk, according to all the 
principles we are entertaining, of being impermissible.  
To illustrate, consider, for example, how this approach would guide Sue in 
Pregnancy. As Lockhart (2000, 51-52) notes, while the question of whether it is 
morally permissible for a woman to abort her foetus is a very morally contentious and 
difficult one, it is almost always considered morally permissible for the woman to 
carry the foetus to term and give birth. If Sue is certain that carrying to term is 
permissible and there is a chance that terminating the foetus is impermissible, PR2 
would maintain that Sue ought to regard herself as permitted (indeed, required) to 
carry to term, since not having the abortion carries no risk of being impermissible 
whilst having the abortion carries some risk of being impermissible. A PR2-inspired 
answer to the question of moral-belief-relative permissibility under principle 
uncertainty is the Hierarchical Approach (HA), so called since it establishes a lexical 
hierarchy among conduct options in terms of the moral status that the deliberating 
agent supposes them to have: 
1. Conduct that is certainly permissible; 
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 Lockhart’s statement of PR2 refers to ‘morally right’ rather than ‘morally permissible’ conduct. One 
reason we have substituted the term ‘permissible’ is to keep the terminology consistent. Another is that 
it is hard to know whether we are on the same ground as Lockhart here. Lockhart (2000, 5) makes it 
clear that he equates ‘rightness’ with ‘permissibility’. However, since he believes that there is 
conceptually no difference between moral bestness and moral rightness (ch. 5), and that there is no firm 
line between rightness and wrongness (and thus, permissibility and impermissibility) (ch. 4), we are not 
confident that Lockhart’s theory addresses the same question as we do. If this turns out to be the case, 
we are happy to simply say that we are adapting Lockhart’s insights to attempt to answer our (different) 
question. 
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2. Conduct that may be permissible; 
3. Conduct that is certainly impermissible. 
 
HA 
Any option that falls within category 1 must always be chosen prior to all options 
in category 2, and any option in category 2 must always be chosen prior to all 
options in category 3. 
 
 At first glance, the HA may seem intuitively plausible. If a conduct option is 
certainly impermissible, we are morally forbidden from performing it. Why, then, 
would we prefer such an option over one that may not be forbidden? It is prima facie 
plausible to think that the very first thing that a theory of conduct under moral 
uncertainty must do is to remove those options we know to be impermissible from the 
table. And if we must choose between an act that we know to be permissible and an 
act that may be impermissible, should we not obviously choose the former? 
Nevertheless we believe that neither the lexical priority of options in category 2 over 
options in category 3 nor of options in category 1 over those in category 2 is to be 
found in the best theory of permissibility under moral uncertainty.  
Regarding the priority of possibly permissible options over certainly 
impermissible options, this becomes less plausible when we consider that not all 
impermissible options are equal—some are worse than others. We have already 
shown, above, that in cases such as Emergency, we should perform certainly 
impermissible options (i.e., Option B) that are not serious moral wrongs over possibly 
permissible options that may also be very serious moral wrongs (i.e., Options A and 
-16- 
C). This leads us to the surprising yet compelling conclusion that moral-belief-relative 
permissibility can include options that we know to be objectively impermissible. 
 
VI Minimizing Expected Impermissibility 
We can reject the priority of possibly permissible options over certainly 
impermissible options if we adopt an Expected Moral Value (EMV) approach. (This 
is in fact what Lockhart does.
17
) The EMV approach tells us, through judging the 
‘moral score’ of a conduct option according to a theory, multiplying it by our 
credence in that theory and then summing the weighted scores of each option, to 
pursue the option or options with the highest expected moral score. When we are 
looking at moral-belief-relative permissibility for conduct, then it would seem 
appropriate to Minimize Expected Impermissibility (MEI).
18
  
MEI 
Under moral uncertainty, the moral-belief-relative permissible option(s) are 
those which minimize expected impermissibility, (where ‘expected 
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 When Lockhart (2000, 82) moves beyond describing conduct options as simply ‘right’ and ‘wrong’ 
he posits this principle, which exemplifies the EMV approach: 
PR4: In situations in which moral agents are uncertain of the degrees of moral rightness of 
some of the alternatives under consideration, a choice of action is rational if and only if the 
action’s expected degree of moral rightness is at least as great as that of any other alternative. 
As previously stated (see n. 16), although Lockhart explicitly equates ‘rightness’ with ‘permissibility’, 
he has other commitments which make it unclear whether we are addressing the same question. A 
similar approach appears to be advocated in Sepielli 2009 although it is, again, not obvious that Sepielli 
is answering the ‘permissibility’ question with which we are concerned. 
18
 This is essentially to create an asymmetry between permissible and impermissible options. 
Permissibility/impermissibility is a binary distinction, but not all impermissible actions are on a moral 
par (e.g., promise-breaking as opposed to killing) – call this degree of wrongfulness – and neither are 
all permissible actions – call this degree of praiseworthiness. MEI takes into account expected 
wrongfulness but not expected praiseworthiness, i.e., it takes into account how far below the 
permissibility line an option (potentially) falls, but not how far above. We think this is correct. If one 
thinks two options have a 50% chance of being permissible, but if impermissible Option A is akin to 
murder and Option B is akin to promise-breaking, only Option B should be seen as moral-belief-
relative permissible – i.e., expected wrongfulness matters. On the other hand, if one is certain that two 
options are permissible, but one has a higher expected praiseworthiness, this will make no difference 
whatsoever to moral-belief-relative permissibility – i.e., expected praiseworthiness is irrelevant (to the 
question we are interested in here). 
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impermissibility’ is a function of likelihood of impermissibility and severity of 
wrongfulness). 
 
This would mean that category 2 options would no longer enjoy lexical priority over 
category 3 options, but that category 1 options would continue to enjoy lexical 
priority over category 2 options. Since category 1 options are certain to be 
permissible, then if one such option is on the table it will be preferred to any possibly 
permissible option, since there is no risk of wrongdoing if one adopts it. 
The absolute priority of certainly permissible actions has significant intuitive 
appeal, and many of Lockhart’s arguments support it forcefully. But there are 
problems with this approach. Consider cases in which an agent has some credence in 
two (or more) moral theories where one theory ‘nests’ inside the other. ‘Nesting’ 
occurs when one theory (the more permissive theory) regards as permissible all the 
options deemed permissible by the other (more restrictive) theory, as well as some 
additional options. To give a concrete example, in Pregnancy the position that 
carrying to term is the only morally permissible option ‘nests inside’ the position that 
both abortion and carrying to term are morally permissible. 
 In such cases, HA and the related MEI approach can be far too demanding. If 
you demand that when conduct that is certainly permissible is available only certainly 
permissible options are moral-belief-relative permissible, this implies that for the 
purposes of deciding what to do we must act in accordance with the most restrictive 
theory that we have any credence in. And it requires that we do this even if we have 
very little credence in this most restrictive theory, and even if the potential 
wrongdoing would be slight, according to this theory. Consider Giving. 
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Giving 
Sue is a person with a relatively good standard of living who has just received 
$30,000 and is deciding how to spend it. She must decide whether and to what 
extent she should contribute to poverty relief. 
 
Sue is 99% convinced of a morality according to which the money is rightly hers, and 
that the amount she may give to charity is wholly at her discretion. It may be morally 
better for her to give away a substantial portion of her newfound gains, but she does 
not act impermissibly if she decides instead to spend it on herself or her near and dear. 
However, Sue has recently come across Peter Singer’s work, according to which, 
‘when we spend our surplus on concerts or fashionable shoes, on fine dining and good 
wines, or on holidays in faraway lands, we are doing something wrong’ (Singer 2009, 
19). Although not entirely convinced by Singer’s arguments, Sue has been swayed to 
some extent, so that she now believes that there is a very small chance (1%) that 
Singer is correct, and that the only permissible course of action is to give away all of 
her gains. However, she does not believe that she does anything morally dreadful if 
she chooses to keep the money – that is, even if keeping the money is wrong, she does 
not consider it to be a serious wrong. 
The lexical priority of certainly permissible options over possibly permissible 
options requires us to believe that Sue is moral-belief-relative permitted only to give 
away all of her money, since this is the only option that both first-order theories in 
which she has credence regard as permissible. Thus, even though she thinks that 
keeping any of the money represents a very small chance of a very small (objective) 
wrong, she should give it all away. Remember, what we are asking ourselves is ‘given 
Sue’s beliefs, what is she permitted to do?’. In this case, Sue has little credence in 
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Singer’s principle, yet that theory is the one that HA and MEI would have her adopt 
for the purposes of action. We believe the lexical priority of certainly permissible over 
possibly permissible options is too demanding given what Sue believes. 
Now consider a case of what we call the ‘Venn’ variety. Like nesting cases, in 
Venn cases there are some options which both the moral theories under consideration 
regard as permissible, and therefore those options are certainly permissible. However, 
each theory regards some further options to be permissible which the other regards as 
impermissible. To take a simple example (which we will call Suicide for reasons that 
will soon become clear), imagine that Sue must decide whether to visit a friend or a 
lonely stranger in hospital. Theory 3 says visiting the friend and not the stranger is 
impermissible. Theory 4 says that visiting the stranger and not the friend is 
impermissible. Neither theory regards these actions as seriously wrong, though. Both 
theories, however, place central importance on Sue’s control over the end of her own 
life, and as such affirm that suicide is permissible. 
According to HA and MEI, Sue is moral-belief-relative required to kill herself 
(as that is the only certainly permissible option), in order to avoid an (objective) 
minor wrong (visiting the friend or the stranger). This result seems especially 
troubling if Sue regards the claim that you are objectively morally required to kill 
yourself as morally repugnant, and so would reject as repugnant any theory of 
objective morality which claimed this. The first-order theories Sue places credence in 
allow suicide because they consider it of central importance that Sue is morally 
permitted to decide when and how her life ends (so far as is possible). Yet on HA and 
MEI Sue finds herself moral-belief-relative required to commit suicide. Her first-
order moral beliefs about the importance of being morally permitted to decide 
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somehow lead to a moral-belief-relative instruction which allows her no such 
decision. 
Many of us are committed to the view that suicide is morally permissible. But 
we are also morally uncertain about a great many things. Given this uncertainty, the 
chance of our going through life without committing some objective moral wrong – 
even if we always act in accordance with what we believe to be permissible, or try to 
minimise moral impermissibility – is certainly greater than zero. That is, by living we, 
at the very least, run a small risk of committing a minor wrong. If HA or MEI are 
correct, many of us should kill ourselves just to avoid this small risk. 
This Venn case is importantly different from the nesting cases like Giving. In 
those cases, under HA and MEI what is moral-belief-relative required (e.g., giving 
away the money) is something that she at least believes may be objectively morally 
required. In the Venn case, the overlapping area that becomes moral-belief-relative 
required, because it is the only option that is certainly permissible (e.g., Sue killing 
herself), is something she is sure is not objectively required. 
That you may be moral-belief-relative required to do something that you are 
sure is not objectively required is counter-intuitive. But we do not think it is a fatal 
flaw for a theory of moral uncertainty. After all, in Emergency we endorsed viewing 
Option B as moral-belief-relative required even though Sue is sure it is (objectively) 
impermissible. But there is an important difference between these two cases. In 
Emergency, Sue’s discomfort was with Option B as an option, and she was able to 
register that discomfort through her scoring of the options. In Suicide, because she 
views suicide as certainly permissible, any theory of moral uncertainty that focuses 
only on whether options are permissible or impermissible (and, if so, how seriously) 
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renders her unable to register any discomfort with, let alone extreme aversion to, the 
instruction ‘suicide is required’. 
Lockhart (2000, 108-110) recognises some of the difficulties with MEI that we 
have identified. However, he tries to deny that cases like Giving are in fact nesting 
cases, since against demanding Singer-like theories we will hold credence not in 
theories that allow us to do with our money what we will, but rather theories that will 
regard giving away all our money as impermissible due to duties we have to ourselves 
and our nearest and dearest. Thus, Lockhart implies, Giving cases will actually be 
what we shall call ‘cross-condemning’ cases, in which those actions permitted by one 
theory are condemned by the other, and vice versa (e.g., Emergency). We are not 
convinced by this response. Many people will not hold credence in such theories 
which regard giving away all of our money as impermissible. So, the HA must still 
deal with its counterintuitive implications for those agents for whom Giving is indeed 
a nesting case. In addition, even if theories which include duties to ourselves and 
those with whom we enjoy special relationships condemn Sue for giving away all her 
money, their influence on the final decision as to what she should regard as 
permissible will be minimal. Most theories that require (and not only allow) her to 
prioritise herself and/or her nearest and dearest will surely nevertheless allow her to 
give away the vast majority of the $30,000 (especially as we imagine that Sue is 
already comfortably well-off before this windfall). 
In order to defend the priority of the certainly permissible, Lockhart uses the 
example of uncertainty regarding abortion. Many readers may be unsympathetic to a 
position that so quickly entails that we should regard abortion as moral-belief-relative 
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impermissible,
19
 but it is hard to resist the conclusion that if an agent genuinely 
believes that there is a chance that by having an abortion she will do something 
morally akin to murder, she should not run this risk when a certainly permissible 
option is on the table (see Moller 2011). However, note that there are two special 
features of the abortion case which make assigning lexical priority to certainly 
permissible acts over possibly permissible acts appear more plausible. These are the 
sharp binary nature of the choice situation—an agent either can abort or not, there are 
no intermediate options—and the magnitude of the potential wrong involved—the 
taking of the life of an innocent being with full moral status.
20
 Affirming the lexical 
priority of certainly permissible options over possibly permissible options will seem 
much less plausible when these two features are not present, and one need not affirm 
this priority to conclude that in this case Sue should not have the abortion. For 
example in Giving there are many options between giving nothing and giving 
everything, and wrongdoing that would be risked in failing to give all of it is (by the 
agent’s own lights) minor. Our belief is that focusing on this case, we can develop an 
intuitive response which would require rejecting both MEI and HA. 
 Let’s say that in Giving, Singer’s theory requires Sue to give $30,000. 
Suppose also that a competing theory in which she has credence says that she is 
entitled to give whatever she chooses (in other words, $0 is permissible and so is 
$30,000). She is uncertain about which of the two theories is correct. For reasons we 
have discussed above, both the HA and MEI state that giving $30,000 is moral-belief-
relative required, for this option is permitted by both candidate theories, whilst giving 
$0 is permitted by only one theory. 
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 It must be noted here that even if one believes that abortion is morally impermissible, or should be 
regarded as moral-belief-relative impermissible, it does not follow that it should be made illegal. 
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 That is, the wrong would be great (we assume) according to the moral theory that she holds 
credence in that condemns abortion. Moral theories that condemn abortions usually condemn them as 
serious wrongs akin to killing the innocent. 
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But there are other options: the minimum amount that Sue is moral-belief-
relative permitted to donate is not limited to being either $0 or $30,000. Indeed, in this 
situation it seems most reasonable that Sue should regard herself as required to give 
away some of the money (reflecting her belief in the Singer theory) and as permitted 
to do what she wants with the rest (reflecting her much stronger belief in the non-
Singer theory).
21
  
 
VIII Moral Uncertainty and the Consequentialism/Non-Consequentialism 
Debate 
Much of the appeal of regarding certainly permissible options over possibly 
permissible options (and thus HA and MEI) appears to rely on the idea that no theory 
‘loses out’ when her moral-belief-relative permissible options are restricted to the 
options that all the theories endorse as permissible. Since all the options endorsed by a 
more restrictive theory as permissible are also regarded as permissible by the less 
restrictive theory, an agent choosing a conduct option endorsed by the more restrictive 
theory is a ‘win-win’—the option will be regarded as permissible by both theories. As 
such, that option is seemingly Pareto superior to any alternative conduct option that is 
viewed as impermissible by any potentially true theory. Since the question we’re 
considering is ‘what conduct option(s) are moral-belief-relative permissible?’ then the 
relevant ‘data’ appear to be what each candidate theory regards as objectively 
permissible, and from this perspective, acting on the more restrictive theory appears to 
be endorsed by both theories. 
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 This includes the option of giving it all away. 
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However, it seems to us that HA and MEI fail to take into account a 
potentially
22
 important additional moral consideration—how the competing moral 
theories view the range or combination of options that are morally permitted, and why 
they recommend that range of options as permissible. Consider Giving. In this case, 
the theory that says Sue’s money is hers to do whatever she chooses with (in which 
Sue places 99% credence) says that both giving and not giving are permissible, while 
Singer’s theory (1%) says that only giving it all is permissible. The thought behind 
HA appears to be ‘since nothing is lost, in terms of permissibility, by giving the 
$30,000, she should view herself as required to give it. There is no objection from the 
first, non-Singer, theory (of which she is 99% convinced) to her giving the $30,000.’ 
There is an important difference, however, between her being permitted to, 
and choosing to, give $30,000 and her being required to give $30,000. While the non-
Singer theory is indeed indifferent between the actions of giving nothing and giving 
$30,000, it is not indifferent between her having the option set of giving $0–$30,000 
as opposed to an option set that consists only of giving $30,000. 
Similarly, in Suicide, the theories that Sue places credence in regard it as 
important that she have full moral discretion over whether she lives or dies. In terms 
of permissibility, these theories are indifferent to whether she decides to kill herself or 
continue living. But they are not indifferent between her being required to kill herself, 
versus merely being permitted. 
In many moral theories (particularly those that incorporate non-
consequentialist elements), giving people a range of morally permitted options 
matters a great deal. This means that options do not matter only as individual options; 
the way that options are combined also matters. The permissible option set matters, 
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 That is, it may be viewed as important by some of the moral theories she places credence in, not that 
we ourselves are undecided about its importance. 
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not just the individual options. This kind of concern is reflected in complaints that 
some moral theories (and the option sets they endorse) are too demanding or too 
restrictive. These are complaints about the option sets recommended by certain moral 
theories.  
HA and MEI are strongly biased against theories that value a range of 
permitted options, or specific option sets, rather than specific options themselves, as 
they only allow theories to register complaints (as it were) to the extent to which other 
theories allow specific options which they condemn. They do not allow theories to 
register complaints about option sets being unduly limited, or take account of the 
reasons why theories regard options (or groups of options) as permissible. We need 
an approach that is better placed to properly represent the concerns of such theories 
under moral uncertainty. Since moral-belief-relative permissibility needs to take 
account of our moral beliefs, when our moral beliefs are not only concerned with 
individual options, neither should our theory of moral-belief-relative permissibility. 
We think that this problem may have been missed in the literature thus far 
because those who write on the problem of moral uncertainty often appear to adopt a 
broadly consequentialist perspective. This is perhaps not surprising. Consequentialists 
have simple and compelling approaches to empirical risk and uncertainty, and it is 
quite tempting to apply those approaches to moral uncertainty. But since 
consequentialists tend to see the best option as the only permissible option, and thus 
the required option, they tend not to see much distinction between what is permissible 
and what is required. Indeed, when consequentialists recognise a plurality of options 
as permissible, it is because they all just happen to maximise the good equally well. 
Therefore, the consequentialist does not seek to defend the permissibility of an option 
as part of a broader set of options, while at the same time considering the idea that it 
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is the only required option to be morally repugnant – either an option maximises the 
good or it doesn’t. But this isn’t how non-consequentialists think. They are concerned 
to provide agents with a range of protected options
23
,  and so are concerned with the 
permissible option set as a whole. One can think suicide rightly forms part of the 
permissible option set, whilst regarding a theory which requires suicide as repugnant.  
To be clear, on non-consequentialist theories, this range of protected options 
should not be concerned only with absence of interference. When non-
consequentialists worry about demandingness or restricted choices, they are not 
worried only about other agents forcing us to do what is demanding or restricting our 
choices. They are concerned about the demandingness and restrictiveness of morality 
itself. 
Approaches to permissibility under moral uncertainty, like HA and MEI, that 
focus only on the moral ‘score’ of individual options do not appear to be able to take 
into account such concerns, and as such, they cannot properly mediate between moral 
theories when some of the theories in question incorporate or are founded on these 
concerns. 
MEI may be the best decision mechanism when we are unsure between two 
consequentialist theories that are indifferent to the range or combination of options 
available to the agent. Therefore, one lesson to draw here could be that the appropriate 
theory of permissibility under principle uncertainty may depend on the range of first-
order moral theories in which the agent has some credence. When theories share 
certain assumptions or positions concerning morality or its structure, those 
assumptions can be taken for granted in trying to mediate between them. But when 
the moral theories disagree on some issue, any decision procedure that neglects 
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 For Frances Kamm this is one of the central tenets of non-consequentialism. For an overview of the 
approaches one make take in defending such a position, see Kamm 1992. 
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entirely the core features of one or more of them will not provide a plausible approach 
to moral-belief-relative permissibility under those conditions. 
However, we are not yet prepared to give up the search for a general theory of 
permissibility under moral uncertainty. We believe that a new approach – Evaluating 
Option Sets – can be applied both when only consequentialist theories are present and 
when non-consequentialist theories enter the fray. 
 
VIII An Alternative: Evaluating Option Sets 
 
Our analysis thus far suggests that the HA and MEI approaches are unable to properly 
take account of moral theories which place importance on agents having option sets 
and thus may find the requirement to do something that they regard as permissible as 
morally troubling. In deciding what is moral-belief-relative permissible, HA and MEI 
look to the surface only, seeing where the theories we place credence in ‘end up’—
which specific options they endorse. We think that, if a theory of moral uncertainty is 
to properly respect theories that care about option sets, and their restrictiveness and 
demandingness, a new approach is required. 
 As a result, we propose the Evaluating Option Sets approach. This approach is 
formed of the following five principles: 
 Evaluating Option Sets 
1. A theory of moral-belief-relative permissibility should seek to identify a 
set of options that are permissible (though this set may include only one 
option) 
2. The potential option sets to be evaluated should not be limited to those 
endorsed by the moral theories in which the agent has credence, but rather 
should be the entire possible range of options sets. 
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3. Each option set must be evaluated from ‘within’ each first-order theory. 
This is done by evaluating, from the perspective of the first-order moral 
theory: 
a. The individual options it contains (looking at whether they are 
permissible or impermissible, and if impermissible, how seriously 
wrongful they would be); and 
b. The option set as a whole. In scoring the option set as a whole, a 
theory should give its own preferred option set the highest score (a 
perfect 0, if option sets are ‘complained about’ through negative 
scores).
24
 
4. Each option set should then be given an overall ‘score’. In order to do this, 
the scores generated by Principles 3a and 3b should be combined. They 
could be summed. This provides the overall score for an option set from 
‘within’ a theory. This score is then multiplied by the (subjective) 
probability that the theory is correct. This is then repeated for each theory, 
and the scores from within each theory are summed to provide the option 
set’s overall score. 
5. The option set with the highest score wins. All options within the winning 
option set are moral-belief-relative permissible. 
  
As we indicated at the outset, we regard this as a promising, but currently incomplete, 
approach. In particular, there will be complications and difficulties within principles 3 
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 We make this stipulation for two reasons. First, it makes the comparison between option sets (viewed 
as option sets) a comparative exercise: a theory should ‘complain’ (through negative scores) about 
option sets which it views as unduly restrictive. A theory should always ‘back its own horse’ by giving 
its preferred option set the highest score, and uniquely so – otherwise on what basis can it claim that 
the option set is the best one? Second, without this stipulation, allowing theories to give their own 
option set less-than-perfect scores can result in counter-intuitive outcomes. We are grateful to a referee 
of this journal for pointing out this danger. 
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and 4 of the above statement, and different variants of the Evaluating Option Sets 
approach may attempt to solve them in different ways. In what follows, we will seek 
to outline the view in general, through an example, and also to explain how we think 
the kinds of calculations required by principles 3 and 4 should be undertaken. We will 
also point toward some difficulties that any variant will face. 
 As an example as to how the Evaluating Option Sets approach works, imagine 
a choice situation in which there are three options – A, B and C. Imagine the agent 
has credence in two theories. One says that only A is permissible. The other says that 
all of option set (ABC) are permissible. (This is, therefore, a nesting case, like 
Giving). 
 Evaluating Options Sets tells us to look for an option set to endorse under 
moral uncertainty (Principle 1). But we are not to choose merely between those option 
sets endorsed by the first order moral theories ((A) and (ABC)). Instead, we look at 
the whole possible range (Principle 2). Here, there are seven potential option sets: 
(ABC), (AB), (AC), (BC), (A), (B), (C). Each must be evaluated.  
 How do we evaluate option sets? First, we must evaluate them according to 
each first order theory (Principle 3). How is this done? Well, option sets are not, of 
course, completely independent of their contents, and thus a large part (and for some 
theories, the whole) of ranking the option set will be a matter of ranking its 
constituent parts in terms of expected impermissibility. Suppose Theory 1 (a 
consequentialist theory), says that only A is permissible (and thus required), that B is 
mildly impermissible (-1) and C is seriously impermissible (-20). We now must turn 
these various evaluations into an overall assessment of the option set’s individual 
options (Principle 3a). One way to do this would be to sum the total, such that the 
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option set scored (from within Theory 1) -21 (0-1-20). We think this is mistaken.
25
 
This is because of the following kind of case. Imagine an option set which contains 
one thousand options, all of which are impermissible but not serious wrongs. They are 
each scored at -1. Now consider an option set that contains only one option, a very 
serious wrong, scored at -1000. On the summing approach, these two options would 
be viewed as equals (all else equal). But surely this is an error. After all, the agent can 
only perform one of the options (in any given moral decision) and so she can either 
perform one of the very minor wrongs, or the one very serious wrong. These are not 
equivalent choices. Instead, we propose to evaluate the options within the option set 
with an average figure. Since each option (if the option set is the winner) will be 
equally permissible at the bar of moral-belief-relative permissibility, each should be 
viewed as equally choice-worthy. And since the agent can choose any option, but can 
only choose one, we should look at the average expected impermissibility of the set. 
Thus, (ABC) should score -7 (-21/3) from within Theory 1. 
 That figure will tell us how the option set should be viewed (from within 
Theory 1) qua its individual options. However, on this approach the evaluation of the 
individual options is not (necessarily) all there is to evaluating option sets. For those 
theories that take it to be important that a range of options are morally permissible, 
the evaluation of an option set will also incorporate an evaluation of the option set 
qua option set (Principle 3b). This is the key innovation of our approach. It allows 
moral theories to score the option sets qua option sets that its competitors recommend 
(as well as some option sets that no theories recommend). So, from the perspective of 
Theory 1, the agent is able to evaluate the option set recommended by Theory 2, not 
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just in terms of its individual options (Principle 3a), but as a set, allowing the theory 
to register complaints about the demandingness or restrictiveness of other option sets. 
For example, take a non-consequentialist theory (Theory 2) in which it is 
thought important to provide an agent with a range of options because this respects 
persons as ends in themselves, rather taking them to be mere producers of the good 
(see, for example, Kamm 1992, 358-359). Imagine this theory takes A, B and C to be 
permissible. In this case, all seven option sets would score a perfect 0 when looked at 
as individual options (Principle 3a), since they all contain only permissible options. 
But, different option sets may or may not manage to treat the person as an end in 
herself, or do so to a greater or lesser degree. Imagine that the option set (AB), for 
example, scores particularly well (on Principle 3b), achieving a -2 overall, but (A) is 
too restrictive, failing to treat the agent as an end in herself, and is given -10. (ABC), 
as Theory 2’s preferred option set, should receive a 0. 
 Our consequentialist theory (Theory 1) does not care for option sets qua option 
sets. It cares about maximizing the good, not the way in which individual options 
interact with each other. From within Theory 1, we think that each option set (when 
evaluated qua option set – Principle 3b) should receive a perfect 0 – no option set 
should be marked ‘down’ for its failure to provide something that the theory does not 
care for. The theory cares about the options, and it is in the first stage (Principle 3a) 
that it is given the opportunity to register ‘complaints’ about these. It may be, 
however, that this way of handling the option set as a whole is controversial. This is 
one place where different variants of the Evaluation Option Sets approach may differ. 
 Once each option set has been scored, both qua individual options, and qua 
option set, from each first-order theory, we can calculate their overall scores 
(Principle 4). Imagine that the agent places a 40% credence in Theory 1, and a 60% 
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credence in Theory 2. Now take option set (A). From Theory 1, it scores a 0 both qua 
options and option set. From Theory 2, it scores 0 for options, but -10 for option set. 
These two scores must then be summed (again, this is possibly a controversial way to 
get from the scores generated at Principles 3a and 3b to an overall assessment from a 
first-order theory). To get the overall figure for an option set, taking all theories into 
account, we must multiply the scores from the first-order theories by the subjective 
probability that the theory is true. Therefore, overall, option set (A) would score -6.
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 Recall that this is a nesting case. On the prevailing approaches to moral 
uncertainty, option set (A) would win, since A is the only certainly permissible 
option. On our view, however, (AB) will beat it. That is because while (AB) would 
lose out from the perspective of Theory 1 because it contains a minor wrong, it would 
beat A from the perspective of Theory 2 as an option set overall. (AB) scores -1.4 
overall.
27
 (AB) would also beat (ABC), as that would be dragged down by the 
presence of C, which would score very badly from the perspective of Theory 1. 
Therefore, (AB) would be the preferred option set, and both A and B would be moral-
belief-relative permissible options. 
 This approach coheres with our intuitive judgments about a range of cases. For 
example, a requirement to commit suicide, even when suicide is regarded as certainly 
permissible, would, when the agent views required suicide as repugnant because of 
the failure of such an option set to deliver what it is she cares about when she 
endorses permissible suicide (namely choice about the end of one’s life), score very 
badly compared with the minor wrong of visiting the wrong person in hospital. But 
the (potential) serious wrong of killing an innocent being of moral standing could 
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 (AB) from Theory 1: -0.5 for options + 0 for option set = -0.5 overall. 
(AB) from Theory 2: 0 for options + -2 for option set = -2 overall 
(AB) overall = (-0.5x0.4)+(-2x0.6) = -1.4 
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mean that in Abortion, viewing oneself as moral-belief-relative required to carry to 
term may be the appropriate stance to take, even considering the limited option range. 
In Giving, given that Sue has very little credence in the Singer theory, and she thinks 
the potential wrong minor, a range of options should be viewed by her as moral-
belief-relative permissible, although this range will not include withholding all of the 
money. 
 
IX Objections and Problems 
 In this final section, we will outline some objections and difficulties with our 
view as stated. Some we feel able to answer. Others we can simply raise and, at best, 
give a first response. 
The first objection is that by focusing on option sets, Evaluating Option Sets 
adopts a non-consequentialist view of morality and as such incorporates a 
controversial moral view. We do not think that our approach incorporates elements of, 
or is unduly biased toward, non-consequentialist theories in any damaging sense. It 
tries to take into account the concerns of some non-consequentialist theories, to be 
sure, but those concerns will influence the outcome of any decision-making under 
moral uncertainty only to the extent that the agent already holds these concerns at the 
level of first-order morality. Our theory will provide the same outcomes as MEI when 
the ‘inputs’ are two (or more) theories that place no weight on the range of options 
open to agents. In such cases, an option set’s score will be determined purely by the 
scores of its constituent options, which will lead to the selection of the option set 
which minimizes expected impermissibility. 
 A second, and related, worry is that this approach ‘double counts’ concerns 
over demandingness and the range of options available to agents. We think this is 
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mistaken. It is true that such concerns are what drove the agent to place credence in 
the permissibility of a given option set (e.g., (ABC)) in the first place. But under MEI 
that concern does not affect what she is moral-belief-relative permitted to do. Under 
MEI, she, in effect, submits a list of discrete options, and is nowhere able to register 
discomfort with or preferences for how those options interact. As an analogy, consider 
two professors who must select which students to give a prize to. Professor 1 submits 
the name of one student, A. Professor 2 has been very impressed by some group work 
done by students A, B, and C. He wishes to award the prize to them jointly. However, 
Professor 2 does not think that any individual in this group should be awarded the 
prize on their own, and would prefer that no prize be awarded rather than it be given 
to any one of these individuals. Under a system in which each professor simply 
submits a list of names, and those names are taken as discrete recommendations, there 
is no way for Professor 2’s belief in the equal deservingness, and the joint 
deservingness, of the candidates, nor his belief that no award is preferable to a single 
award, to be taken into account. Anyone who looked at the lists, saw A on both, and 
awarded the prize to A for this reason, would not have taken Professor 2’s views 
adequately into account. 
 Our belief is that MEI is in a similar position. While a concern to avoid over-
demandingness and/or treat agents as ends in themselves may drive the non-
consequentialist theory’s list of preferred options, if the theory’s entry into the 
uncertainty decision-making procedure can only take the form of a list of options, its 
concerns regarding option sets, demandingness, and restrictiveness cannot be taken 
into account. 
A third problem concerns inter-theoretic comparisons of value. As we 
observed above (see introduction, and n. 13), one of the most difficult problems 
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regarding theories concerning moral uncertainty is the issue of inter-theoretic 
comparisons of value. In order for Theory 1’s judgment of Action C being -20 to be 
commensurate with Theory 2’s judgment of it as 0, the two theories must be trading in 
the same currency. Our theory, unfortunately, further complicates this already 
difficult issue. First, it requires options to be measured in terms, not of their expected 
‘value’ in the sense of ‘goodness’ (which is how a purely consequentialist approach 
taking consideration of only consequentialist theories might do things), but rather 
their wrongfulness. This means that we need consequentialist theories to convert 
value into permissibility/impermissibility, and then that must be converted back into a 
value – the wrongfulness. However, we think that on all plausible moral theories, 
impermissible options can nevertheless be better and worse. Killing is worse than 
promise-breaking on the non-consequentialist account, and doing no good is worse 
than doing some, but not enough, good on the consequentialist account. Indeed, our 
approach may be on comparatively comfortable ground here. Insofar as each 
candidate theory is trying to provide judgments about moral permissibility, it is at 
least trading in the same currency as all the others. This is not true of opposing 
consequentialist theories which have different accounts of the good.  
Second, in order to apply our approach there must be, at the least, two kinds of 
value that can be compared across theories: the values of options (as mentioned 
above, and as would also need to be the case for MEI and Sophisticated Theory 
Selection) and the values of option sets. Third, these two kinds of value must, ideally, 
be commensurable, or at least comparable, with each other as well.
28
 We do not know 
if this is possible. It seems to us that we can provide these valuations intuitively. It is, 
after all, a single agent who must provide the various values: the values may be inter-
                                                 
28
 This needn’t necessarily be the case however – each option set might attract two different scores, one 
based on options and the other on the set as a whole, and the selection of the final option set may be 
based on intuitively weighting the two values. 
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theoretical, but they are intra-agent. But our task here is not to try to solve these 
knotty issues: our approach is to try to inform the debate about inter-theoretic 
comparisons of value through identifying the best theory of moral-belief-relative 
permissibility under moral uncertainty. In doing so we can see which kinds of 
comparison we would ideally like to be able to undertake. We believe that the 
Evaluating Option Sets theory is a plausible and original answer to the normative 
question, and as such should inform work on the difficult issue of comparisons that 
plagues all theories of moral uncertainty. 
The final problem concerns option sets that receive equal scores.
29
 To see why 
this is a problem, consider a choice situation in which the agent faces three options: 
D, E, and F. Now consider two theories, which score the options as follows: 
 Theory x Theory y 
D 0 0 
E 0 -4 
F -4 0 
 
Now, imagine that the agent places equal credence in the two theories. This would 
mean, looking solely at individual options, the option sets would score as follows: (D) 
= 0; (DE) = -1; (DF) = -1; (DEF) = -1.33 
Imagine (D) scores very poorly on the overall option set calculation, and so is 
eliminated from consideration, while (DE), (DF) and (DEF) all score equally on that 
measure. We now face the following puzzling situation: (DE) and (DF) score equally. 
What should we tell the agent? The obvious thing is to tell her to choose between 
these two option sets. But if we do this, she effectively has a choice of options D, E 
                                                 
29
 We are grateful to a referee of this journal for bringing this problem to our attention. 
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and F. But (DEF) is itself a defeated, and inferior, option set. We are unsure how best 
to deal with this problem. We think that perhaps she should choose an option set, and 
then stick to it. This isn’t quite the same as having (D,E,F) as her option set, since it is 
a two stage process (choose option set, choose option). Practically-speaking, however, 
it seems near identical. 
 
X Concluding Remarks 
Evaluating Option Sets allows agents to carve out a range of legitimate options 
in a way that respects all of the moral concerns that they believe may apply to the 
situation (with regard to permissibility), and the credence they place in various 
theories (and thus those concerns). Other theories seem to have focussed simply on 
‘outputs’ (individual options), rather than looking to what range of options different 
moral theories allow, and why. We believe, therefore, that Evaluating Option Sets 
offers a better approach to the question of moral-belief-relative permissibility. There 
are some issues with the approach, but we believe it is worth pursuing until such 
issues are shown to be insurmountable. The most difficult issue the theory faces – 
inter-theoretic comparisons of value – is one that besets all theories. 
 Of course, in emergency situations and the like, it is unlikely that we 
will take out our pen and paper (or smart phone) and perform the kinds of calculations 
that the theory demands. But this is an issue that all approaches to moral uncertainty 
face. In our view we should get the view right ‘on paper’ first. This, in turn, may lead 
to the development of easier to use heuristics and rules of thumb. 
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